In Re Term of Parental Rights as to C.D.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.D.

No. 1 CA-JV 24-0176
FILED 04-10-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JS21419
The Honorable Pamela S. Gates, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Jamie R. Heller
Counsel for Appellant

Ellsworth Family Law, P.C., Mesa
By Glenn D. Halterman
Counsel for Appellees

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge James B. Morse Jr. and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.D.
Decision of the Court

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1 Clayton B. appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating his
parental rights to Claire (a pseudonym). For the following reasons, we
affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Melissa D. (“Mother”) became pregnant with Claire in late
2022. Clayton presumed he was the father because he and Mother were
dating. A few weeks before Claire’s birth, Mother told Clayton she thought
another man was the father. Claire’s birth certificate did not name a father.

¶3 Mother and Clayton confirmed that he was Claire’s father
through an at-home paternity test soon after Claire’s birth. But they did not
attach their names to the test and Clayton’s attorney told him it was
insufficient to establish paternity in court.

¶4 Mother and Claire lived with Mother’s parents
(“Grandparents”) while Clayton continued his career as a truck driver with
the understanding that he and Mother would raise Claire together. Mother
unexpectedly died in July 2023 while Clayton was working out of state.
Grandparents became Claire’s guardians, but she lived primarily with
Mother’s sister and her family (“Aunt,” “Uncle,” and “Cousins”).

¶5 Clayton last saw Claire in August 2023 at Mother’s memorial
service. Clayton said he would remain in contact with Claire over the next
few months as he tried to find work that would allow him to remain close
to Claire, but he did not remain in contact except for a few text messages in
September and October.

¶6 In September 2023, Clayton petitioned to establish paternity.
Grandparents then petitioned to terminate Clayton’s parental rights. The
juvenile court held a contested termination adjudication hearing. Clayton,
Mother’s mother, and Uncle testified. Uncle testified he and Aunt provided
for Claire’s needs while Clayton had not assisted at all, Cousins viewed
Claire as a sibling, and Aunt and Uncle’s family was the only one Claire
had known.

¶7 The court granted Grandparents’ petition, finding a statutory
ground for termination because Clayton failed to file a notice of claim of
paternity within the requisite timeframe. The court also found termination
was in Claire’s best interests.

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 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.D.
Decision of the Court

¶8 Clayton appeals the court’s order terminating his parental
rights and we have jurisdiction. A.R.S. § 8-235(A).

DISCUSSION

¶9 To terminate the parent-child relationship, the court must
find (1) at least one statutory ground under Section 8-533(B) by clear and
convincing evidence, and (2) termination is in the child’s best interests by a
preponderance of the evidence. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146,
149–50, ¶ 8 (2018).

¶10 When reviewing a juvenile court’s termination order, we will
accept the court’s factual findings “if reasonable evidence and inferences
support them.” Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478, ¶ 30
(2023). “Because the juvenile court is in the best position to weigh evidence
and assess witness credibility,” we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to sustaining the juvenile court’s decision. See id. at 478–79, ¶¶ 30,
32 (cleaned up). We will affirm “the juvenile court’s legal conclusions
regarding the statutory ground for termination . . . unless they are clearly
erroneous.” Id. at ¶ 31. And the juvenile court’s legal conclusions are clearly
erroneous only if “as a matter of law no one could reasonably find the
evidence to be clear and convincing.” Id.

¶11 One statutory ground for termination of parental rights is
when a “putative father fail[s] to file a notice of claim of paternity” with the
putative fathers registry within 30 days after the child’s birth. A.R.S. §§ 8-
533(B)(6), -106.01(B). Clayton claims he is a potential father instead of a
putative father. He argues Section 8-533(B)(6) is thus inapplicable to him
and termination on this ground was improper.

¶12 A putative father “is a man who is or claims to be the father
of the child and whose paternity has not been established,” while a
potential father is “a man, identified by the mother in an affidavit, who is
or could be the father of the child, but whose paternity has not been
established.” In re M.N., 563 P.3d 136, 140, ¶ 22 (2025).

¶13 Clayton does not claim that he has an affidavit from Mother.
Instead, he argues that, under David C. v. Alexis S., 240 Ariz. 53 (2016), he is
excused from that affidavit requirement and is a potential father. David C.
is an adoption case involving a mother who signed an affidavit falsely
stating the child’s father was unknown even though the father expressed
interest in parenting the child. 240 Ariz. at 55, ¶ 2. The adoptive parents
petitioned to adopt and published a notice of the pending adoption. Id. at ¶
3. The father filed a paternity action the same day and amended his petition

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 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.D.
Decision of the Court

as he learned more information about his child. Id. at ¶ 5. The court held the
father was a potential father who timely filed and pursued his paternity
action despite not being listed in an affidavit. Id. at 58, ¶ 24.

¶14 “Unlike David C., this is a severance action,” Frank R. v.
Mother Goose Adoptions, 243 Ariz. 111, 117, ¶ 28 (2017), and different statutes
apply. The court in David C. considered the interplay between two adoption
statutes, neither of which is at issue here. See David C., 240 Ariz. at 55, ¶ 7.
And while the father in David C. diligently pursued his paternity action,
Clayton did not—the court dismissed his case for a lack of prosecution.

¶15 The juvenile court correctly considered Clayton a putative
father because he claimed to be Claire’s father and his paternity had not
been established. See In re M.N., 563 P.3d at 140, ¶ 22. He was thus required
to timely file a notice with the putative fathers registry to establish
paternity. See A.R.S. § 8-106.01(B). Because he failed to do so within the 30-
day “bright-line deadline,” Frank R., 243 Ariz. at 116, ¶ 24, the court did not
abuse its discretion in finding a statutory ground for termination by clear
and convincing evidence. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(6).

¶16 Clayton also claims the court abused its discretion by finding
termination was in Claire’s best interests, arguing the court ignored parts
of the record. “Termination is in the child’s best interests if either: the child
(1) will benefit from severance; or (2) the child will be harmed if severance
is denied.” Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 13. A child’s prospective adoption
can support a court’s best-interests finding. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239
Ariz. 1, 5, ¶ 17 (2016).

¶17 The court found termination was in Claire’s best interests
because Claire would benefit from formalizing the parent-child
relationship she shared with Aunt and Uncle. Testimony from both Clayton
and Uncle support the court’s findings. Uncle testified that he and Aunt
intended to adopt Claire if the court terminated Clayton’s parental rights.
Clayton testified that Aunt and Uncle were “good people,” and Claire and
Cousins were forming sibling bonds. The record thus supports the juvenile
court’s finding that termination was in Claire’s best interests.

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 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.D.
Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶18 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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